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NOTES

DISCOVERING JUSTICE IN TOXIC TORT
LITIGATION: CPLR 214-c
In the typical negligence action, the statute of limitations1 accrues at the time the tortious conduct injures the plaintiff.2 Difficulties arise, however, when the potential plaintiff is exposed to a
harmful substance which causes an injury that does not become
apparent for several years.' New York traditionally has held that

' See generally D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 33-57 (1978)

(general discussion of

statutes of limitations); Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.
L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) (discussing functions and purposes of statutes of limitations).
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to prescribe the time in which a plaintiff must
commence an action, thereby protecting defendants from the burden of defending against
stale claims. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944). In Railway Express, the Supreme Court stated that:
Statutes of limitation ... are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is
that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.
Id. at 348-49.
2 See Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 235, 177 N.E. 421, 424 (1931). In negligence
claims the essence of a cause of action is damage or injury to the plaintiff. Id. The statute of
limitations is generally held not to begin to run until some type of damage has occurred. See
White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 274-76, 18 A.2d 185, 186-87 (1941); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984). There is little difficulty in ascertaining the time at which damage occurs and the cause of action accrues in a typical negligence
action. See D. SIEGEL, supra note 1, § 40, at 42. However, in a personal injury action based
in negligence, the period runs from the moment of injury, see id., or "when there is a wrongful invasion of personal or property rights." Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.,
270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936). See also Note, supra note 1, at 1200 (discussing
computation of period of limitations).
3 Compare Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 958-59, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905
(1981) (statute runs from date cancer begins, not discovery or exposure to asbestos) with
Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 1299, 446
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (1981) (mem.) (statute runs from date of last exposure to asbestos), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982). See D. SIEGEL, supra note 1, § 40, at 42. "[T]his time-of-injury

CPLR 214-c

the cause of action accrues on the date of exposure, despite the
possibility that the plaintiff may become aware of the injury only
after the statute of limitations has expired.4 The harsh results
caused by this traditional exposure rule have led a majority of jurisdictions 5 to adopt the "discovery rule," which tolls the comrule can work to the plaintiff's detriment when the cause of the injury is more subtle." Id.
See, e.g., Schmidt, 270 N.Y. at 301, 200 N.E. at 827 (1936) (action accrued when dust inhaled, even though disease resulting from inhalation was not discovered for several years).
"Real difficulties have resulted where. ...[as in] actions involving toxic drugs or chemicals, the statute has run before the plaintiff discovers that he has suffered injury, and sometimes even before the plaintiff himself has suffered the injury." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,

supra note 2, § 30, at 165. Many hazardous substances cause ill-effects that do not manifest
themselves for years. See Birnbaum, "FirstBreath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in
Products Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 285 (1977). For example, DES, a drug taken by
women to prevent miscarriages, has been banned because it has been linked to cancer in the
female children of women who used the drug. See id. at 285 n.26. If plaintiff does not learn
of the carcinogenic qualities of the product until several years after exposure or ingestion,
some courts have urged that it would be unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional to bar a
claim before it was possible for the plaintiff to learn of the injury sustained. See, e.g.,
Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 219, 188 N.E.2d 142, 146, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963). See also
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1949) (statute of limitations does not begin to run
until symptoms become manifest).
4 See Schmidt, 270 N.Y. at 300-01, 200 N.E. at 827; see also Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at
216, 188 N.E.2d at 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (citing Schmidt as controlling). In Schmidt,
plaintiff sued for damages resulting from the inhalation of harmful dust. Schmidt, 270 N.Y.
at 297, 200 N.E. at 825. The New York Court of Appeals held that the "injury to the plaintiff was complete when the alleged negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff to inhale
the deleterious dust." Id. at 301, 200 N.E. at 827.
The New York Court of Appeals most recently reaffirmed its adherence to the Schmidt
rule in Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 890, 467 N.E.2d 517, 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d
853, 854 (1984) (mem.) (cancer victim time barred in action against DES manufacturer),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985), and Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 60 N.Y.2d 417, 422,
457 N.E.2d 1150, 1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (1983) (action accrues on date of implantation
of artificial heart valve).
See generally Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 282-84 (discussing New York's date of exposure rule); infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text (examining New York's adherence to
date of exposure rule).
' See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 165-67. The apparent injustice
of the date of exposure approach has led many courts to seek to circumvent this rule. Id. at
166. By 1982, thirty-six jurisdictions had adopted a discovery rule. See Note, Denial of a
Remedy: Former Residents of Hazardous Waste Sites and New York's Statute of Limitations, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 170 n.55 (1982). By 1983, this number had increased to
thirty-nine. See J. TRAUBERMAN, STATUTORY REFORM OF "Toxic TORTS": RELIEVING LEGAL,
SCIENTIFIC, AND ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE CHEMICAL VICTIM 173 n.94 (citing SUPERFUND
SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAzARDOUS WASTES: ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES 115-17 (July 1, 1982 draft) [hereinafter INJURIES AND
DAMAGES]). "[T]he trend in most jurisdictions is to start the running of the judicial clock
only after the victim has discovered or reasonably could have discovered the harm." J.
TRAUBERMAN, supra, at 14.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:262

mencement of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff has discovered, or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should
have discovered, the injury.' While New York has for some time
applied the discovery rule to certain types of actions,7 the New
These jurisdictions have apparently realized that the issue of accrual in exposure cases
has taken on greater significance in recent years because of the number of substances linked
to cancer. See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 284-85. "There is a growing awareness that of the
thousands of commercially produced chemical compounds to which we are all ... exposed,
many are causally linked with cancer and other fatal diseases that develop over a sustained
period of time with serious or fatal effects." Id. at 285.
0 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 2, § 30, at 166. The discovery rule has been
described, in an oft-cited dissent by Judge Frank, as follows:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a
house never built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as sort of a legal
"axiom," that a statute of limitations does not begin to run'against a cause of
action before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available
to the plaintiff.
Dincher v. Martin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting).
There are several formulations of the discovery rule. One approach holds that the statute of limitations runs from the time the disease manifests itself. See Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 281. In Urie, plaintiff, a railroad employee,
contracted silicosis by inhaling silica dust. Urie, 337 U.S. at 165-66. In determining the time
of commencement of the cause of action, the Supreme Court stated:
It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with
being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure
are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the
afflicted employee can be held to be "injured" only when the accumulated effects
of the deleterious substance manifest themselves....
Id. at 170 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal. App.
378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932)).
Another formulation of the discovery rule states that the period runs from the time the
disease is diagnosed. See Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1961). The
Young court concluded that the time "when the plaintiff has reason to know he has been
injured . . . [g]enerally ... will be when his condition is diagnosed." Id.
Finally, several courts have adopted the view that the cause of action accrues when
plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his injury and its causal connection to defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 270-72, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973) (action accrues when plaintiff discovers radiation therapy was negligently administered); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 171, 371 A.2d 170, 173 (1977) (discovery rule applies
to case of blindness caused by oral contraceptive).
For a discussion of the various formulations of the discovery rule, see infra notes 66-75
and accompanying text. See also Birnbaum, supra note 3 (discussion of discovery rule and
its application).
7 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 213(8) (McKinney 1978) (fraud); id. § 206(b) (breach of
warranty of authority); id. § 214-a (foreign object medical malpractice); id. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1987) (Agent Orange exposure); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 28 (McKinney Supp.
1987) (occupational diseases). See also infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text (discussing
gradual acceptance of discovery rule in New York).
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York Legislature brought the state in line with the majority of jurisdictions when it enacted Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR") section 214-c, 8 providing that an action arising out of
exposure to a harmful substance may be commenced within three
years after the injury is discovered.9
This Note will first examine the background of accrual in exposure causes of action in New York and the gradual acceptance of
the discovery rule. An analysis of the provisions of CPLR section
214-c and the problems likely to arise from its ambiguous language
will then be undertaken, with suggested solutions to these
problems. Finally, the various formulations of the discovery rule
will be discussed, and it will be asserted that while the adoption of
a broad discovery rule was a welcomed amendment, the New York
Legislature failed to adopt the best formulation of the rule.
THE "FIRST BREATH" RULE

The law in New York governing exposure cases had traditionally been that the statute of limitations commenced upon exposure
to the harmful substance which caused the injury. 10 In Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch TransportationCo.," the New York Court of
Appeals adopted this "first breath" rule,' 2 holding that the injury
was sustained at the time of exposure to the toxic substance despite the fact that the injury was not discovered until several years
later. 3 In Schmidt, the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from
the prolonged inhalation of silica dust.'4 Since the plaintiff's injury
did not become apparent until after the three year statute of limitations had run, as measured from the time of inhalation, the ac- N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987). For a discussion of section
214-c, see infra notes 41-71 and accompanying text.
* See id.
See, e.g., Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 301, 200 N.E.
824, 827 (1936) (action accrued on exposure to harmful dust); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport
Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 215-16 188 N.E.2d 142, 143, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (action
accrued when toxic substance injected into plaintiff), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
1 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936).
2 See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 282; supra note 4 and accompanying text. Pursuant
to the first breath rule, a cause of action accrues upon a plaintiff's exposure to a harmful
agent, regardless of whether symptoms of the resulting disease accompany that exposure.
Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 282. The rule is founded upon the idea that the harmful agent
acts immediately upon the plaintiff. Id.
" See Schmidt, 270 N.Y. at 300-01, 200 N.E. at 827.
14 Id. at 297, 200 N.E. at 825. As a result of the exposure, plaintiff contracted a lung
disease, pneumoconiosis. Id.
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tion was not timely. "I The Schmidt court held that exposure to
and inhalation of silica dust was the injury which constituted an
actionable wrong,'0 and the injury "was complete when the alleged
negligence of the defendant caused the plaintiff to inhale the dele17
terious dust.'
While the full effects of the Schmidt decision were not immediately realized, as industrialization progressed, the increasing possibility of exposure to harmful substances caused the injustice of
the first breath rule to become readily apparent. 8 Although the
New York Court of Appeals recognized that a cause of action accrued only when there was some actual deterioration of the plaintiff's body,' 9 it continued to follow the reasoning of Schmidt that
the dust immediately acted upon the plaintiff's body to cause an
injury.2 0 Notwithstanding entreaties by many judges that a less
15

Id. at 298, 200 N.E. at 826. Plaintiff had inhaled the dust while employed by defend-

ant, and his employment had ceased more than three years before the action was commenced. Id.
16 Id. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827. After stating that it was the exposure to the silica dust
which constituted a wrongful invasion, and, therefore, an actionable wrong, the court went
on to say that:
There can be no doubt that a cause of action accrues only when the forces wrongfully put in motion produce injury....
That does not mean that the cause of action accrues only when the injured
person knows or should know that the injury has occurred. The injury occurs
when there is a wrongful invasion of personal or property rights and then the
cause of action accrues.
Id.
17Id. at 301, 200 N.E. at 827. The court went on to state that the defendant was liable
for all damages resulting from this injury, and that plaintiff could have brought an action
against defendant immediately after he inhaled the dust. Id. "In that action the plaintiff
could recover all damages which he could show had resulted or would result therefrom." Id.
It is submitted that this view, at the very least, is unrealistic. It is further suggested that,
since damage is an essential element of a negligence claim, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 2, § 30, at 165, if plaintiff brought such an action before the damage had resulted, it would be dismissed for a failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 1978).
18See Marlin & Levy, New York Adopts Discovery Rule for Latent-Disease Cases,
N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1986, at 30, col. 1. A survey of recent case law reveals the expanding number and type of latent disease cases that would be barred under the Schmidt rule. See, e.g.,
Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1984)
(mem.) (DES action), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981) (mem.) (asbestos exposure), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 967 (1982); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391
N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (plaintiff injected with cancer-causing drug).
11See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 217, 188 N.E.2d 142,
144, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
20 See Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at 217, 188 N.E.2d at 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717. See also
Fleishman, 62 N.Y.2d at 890, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (departure from prior
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harsh rule be adopted, 1 the court of appeals maintained that any
departure from the traditional rule must come from the legislature.22
EMERGENCE OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IN NEW YORK

While the Schmidt first breath rule remained intact in exposure cases for some fifty years, the discovery rule gained gradual
acceptance in other types of actions.23 New York first extended the
discovery rule to causes of action based on fraud.24 Under CPLR
section 213(8), the time within which an action for fraud must be
commenced is computed from the time when the fraud was or
should have been discovered.25 Similarly, a discovery accrual is also
decisions unwarranted); Steinhardt,54 N.Y.2d at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at
246 (expressly reaffirming Schmidt rule); Thornton, 47 N.Y.2d at 781-82, 391 N.E.2d at
1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (refusing to adopt discovery rule).
In Schwartz, a substance was injected into plaintiff's sinuses in 1944 to make them
perceptible to X-rays. Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at 215, 188 N.E.2d at 143, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
Some of the substance remained in plaintiff's head and produced a carcinoma requiring the
removal of an eye in 1957. Id. An action was commenced in 1959. Id. The court stated, in
discussing prior New York cases and commentaries, that not one of the "views point to a
discovery rule. They would indicate ... that the action accrues only when there is some
actual deterioration of a plaintiff's bodily structure ....
But Judge Lehman's view in the
Schmidt case is right as we must assume that the dust immediately acted upon Schmidt's
lung tissue." Id. at 217, 188 N.E.2d at 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717. While the court recognized
that the proper rule may be that the action does not accrue until plaintiff is actually
harmed, it is submitted that the court felt constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis and
applied the Schmidt rule.
11 See Fleishman, 62 N.Y.2d at 891, 467 N.E.2d at 519, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 855 (Cooke,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Cooke urged that "[i]t is time to abandon that inequitable
[Schmidt] rule as a mistake of the past that we have a duty to correct." Id. The dissent in
Schwartz argued that plaintiff's theory of action was that "the carcinogenic qualities of the
injection were not discoverable by him until after the 1957 surgical operation. If that be the
fact, it would be unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional to hold that his time to sue
expired before it was possible for him to learn of the wrong." Schwartz, 12 N.Y.2d at 219,
188 N.E.2d at 146, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (Desmond, C.J., dissenting). See also Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949) (legislature did not intend plaintiff's "blameless ignorance" to deprive him of a cause of action); Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d
Cir. 1960) (for statute to begin to run before plaintiff could ascertain injuries would be
unreasonable).
22 See, e.g., Fleishman, 62 N.Y.2d at 890, 467 N.E.2d at 518, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (developing new polices is role of legislature); Thornton, 47 N.Y.2d at 781-82, 391 N.E.2d at
1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (extending discovery rule is for legislature, not courts).
23 See supra note 7.
" See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 213(8) (McKinney 1978). This section was enacted in
1965. Id.
25 See id. When the discovery rule is utilized in an action for fraud, two alternative
measurements are used to compute the applicable statute of limitations. See id. § 203(f)
(McKinney 1978). Plaintiff has either six years from the time the fraud was committed, see
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applied to actions based on a breach of warranty of authority. 2
After the legislature had consistently refused to act,2 7 the initial
judicial application of the discovery rule to personal injury actions
was in the medical malpractice area.28 In Flanaganv. Mount Eden
General Hospital,29 foreign objects left inside the plaintiff's body
during surgery were discovered and removed eight years later.3 0
The Flanagan court held that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until plaintiff could have discovered the malpractice.3 1
id. § 213(8), or two years from discovery of the fraud, whichever is longer, see id. § 203(f).
See also D. SIEGEL, supra note 1, § 43, at 45 & Supp. 1987, at 16 (discussing discovery
accruals).
26 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 206(b) (McKinney 1978). The period for such an action
is six years from the misrepresentation, see id. § 213(2), or two years from its discovery, see
id. § 203(f). See also D. SIEGEL, supra note 1, § 43, at 46 (discussing accrual of breach of
warranty of authority).
27 See D. SIEGEL, supra note 1, § 42, at 44.
28 See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
29 Id.
30Id. at 428, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
22 Id.
at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27. The court discussed and distinguished its decision in Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188
N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963). See also Flanagan, 24
N.Y.2d at 430, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26. In Flanagan,the court concluded
that the difference between negligent medical treatment cases and cases involving negligent
malpractice in which a foreign object is left inside the patient's body is that "[i]n the latter
no claim can be made that the patient's action may be feigned or frivolous." Id., 248 N.E.2d
at 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Recognizing the "unsoundness of the traditional rule," the
Flanagan court stated that:
It simply places an undue strain upon common sense, reality, logic and simple
justice to say that a cause of action had "accrued" to the plaintiff until the X-ray
examination disclosed a foreign object within her abdomen and until she had a
reasonable basis for believing or reasonable means of ascertaining that the foreign
object was within her abdomen as a consequence of the negligent performance of
the [operation].
Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26 (quoting Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 149 W.
Va. 783, 792, 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1965)).
Prior to the Flanagandecision, the New York Court of Appeals had affirmed, without
opinion, a decision which held that in a foreign object malpractice case, the statute of limitations ran from the commission of the act. Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.Y.S. 529 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 175 N.E. 892 (1930). The Flanagancourt noted
that when Conklin was decided, no other jurisdiction had a contrary rule. Flanagan, 24
N.Y.2d at 430, 248 N.E.2d at 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26. At the time of Flanagan,however,
there was a split on this issue in the country. Id. at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at
27. Nine jurisdictions limited the discovery rule to foreign object medical malpractice cases,
see id. at 431 & n.1, 248 N.E.2d at 873 & n.1, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27 & n.1; eleven had adopted
the rule for all malpractice cases, see id. at 432-33 & n.2, 248 N.E.2d at 873 & n.2, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 27 & n.2; two had adopted the discovery rule by statute, see id. at 432 & n.3,
248 N.E.2d at 873 & n.3, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27 & n.3; and twenty-one states did not apply a
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Although later cases applying this rule did not insist on the presence of a foreign object,3 2 the legislature codified the discovery rule
in 1975 under CPLR section 214-a, but expressly limited it to actions involving foreign objects33 and explicitly excluded from its
coverage actions based on exposure to chemicals. 4
Through the enactment of CPLR section 214-b in 1981, New
York extended the discovery rule to actions arising out of exposure
to a toxic substance by creating a cause of action for Vietnam War
veterans exposed to Agent Orange.3 5 Although CPLR 214-b is very
limited in scope, 36 its adoption signaled a growing acceptance of
the discovery rule. In addition, the New York Legislature amended
section 28 of the Workers' Compensation Law in 1984, to include a
broad discovery rule for occupational disease claims.3 Section 28
applies this rule to diseases caused by exposure to any chemical
compound, 38 and provides that the afflicted employee may bring
his claim within two years after the time he knew or should have
known that his disease was caused by the nature of his
employment. 9
discovery rule. holding instead that the action accrued on the commission of the malpractice, see id. at 432 & n.4, 248 N.E.2d at 873 & n.4, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27 & n.4. See generally
Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions,47
CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1962) (discussing medical malpractice statutes of limitations and urging
adoption of discovery rule); Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes of Limitation: Uniform Extension of the Discovery Rule, 55 IowA L. REV. 486 (1969) (discussing application of
discovery rule in malpractice actions and urging states to accept discovery rule).
S2 See, e.g., Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 App. Div. 2d 1, 3, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (4th Dep't
1972) (damage done to internal organ during surgery-no foreign object left inside). The
Dobbins court noted that "professional diagnostic judgment is not involved," so false claims
were minimized and the Flanagan standards met. Id. at 4, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
"3 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & P. § 214-a (McKinney 1975). This section provides that
[W]here the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of
the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such
discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such
discovery, whichever is earlier.
Id. (emphasis added).
3' See id. The section states that "the term 'foreign object' shall not include a chemical
compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device." Id.
11 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-b (McKinney Supp. 1987).
-6 See id. The statute applies only to personal injury actions based on exposure to
Agent Orange while serving as a member of the United States Army in Indo-China from
1962 through 1975. Id. CPLR 214-b provides that such actions may be commenced within
two years from the date the injury was or should have been discovered. Id.
37 See N.Y. WORK. CotiP. LAW § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
See id.
"' See id. This approach is known as the causal connection formulation of the discovery
rule. See supra note 6; infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. At least thirteen states

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:262

CPLR 214-c: PROVISIONS AND PROBLEMS
The first breath rule was finally laid to rest in July 1986, when
CPLR section 214-c became law in New York. 40 A broad discovery
rule, applicable to actions arising out of exposure to any substance,
appears in CPLR 214-c(2), which provides that the statute of limitations is computed from the "discovery of the injury,"'" a term
left to be defined by the courts. 42 A wide range of definitions is
possible for this term, as indicated by the varying formulations developed in construing the discovery rule.4" A narrow interpretation
of this term provides that the statute of limitations starts to run at
the injured party's first sign or symptom of disease. 44 It is submithave adopted this form of the discovery rule. See J. TRAUBERMAN, supra note 5, at 173 n.94
(citing INJURIES AND DAMAGES, supra note 5, at 28-29).
40 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987). The statute became
effective on July 30, 1986. See id. "This bill.., repeals that archaic rule and replaces it with
a fair and simple rule which permits a person to discover his or her injury before the statutory time period for suit begins to run." Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 682,
N.Y. Laws (July 30, 1986), reprinted in [19861 N.Y. Laws 3182 (McKinney) [hereinafter
Memorandum].
41 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987). CPLR 214-c(2) provides
that:
[T]he three year period within which an action to recover damages for personal
injury or injury to property caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance ... must be commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of
the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is
earlier.
Id.

42 See Rheingold, The New Statute of Limitations in Tort Actions in New York,
N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1986, at 1, col. 4, at 3, col. 1. It is submitted that the legislature should
have expressly defined the term "discovery of injury" in the statute rather than pass this
burden on to the courts. In contrast, another important term in the statute, "exposure," is
expressly defined, see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
43 See supra note 6; infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
44 See Rheingold, supra note 42, at 1, col. 4. The first sign of the disease, however,
would not necessarily put an injured party on notice as to what he is suffering from and,
consequently, he may not be cognizant of the fact that he has a claim, or of the identity of a
potential defendant. See Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961). In Young,
the plaintiff was a former railroad employee who had been exposed to silica dust from 1945
through 1954. Id. at 501. Plaintiff left defendant's employ in 1954 because of shortness of
breath. Id. at 503. Plaintiff's condition was diagnosed as silicosis in 1956, less than three
years (the statute of limitations for this action) before the suit was filed. Id. Defendant
argued that the action accrued, at the latest, on plaintiff's last day of employment. Id. Since
plaintiff came from a mining region where silicosis was common, it was contended that he
should be charged with the knowledge that shortness of breath is a symptom of silicosis. Id.
Therefore, the plaintiff had reason to know as early as 1954 that he had contracted the
disease. Id. Plaintiff, however, had complained of other ailments before leaving his job, including kidney trouble, and he had recently undergone surgery. Id. In holding that the ac-
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ted that such an interpretation defeats the purpose of the statute
and could result in as much injustice as did the first breath rule.4 5
A more liberal interpretation of the discovery rule would not start
the clock until plaintiff's condition had been diagnosed by a licensed physician." It is submitted that this is a more equitable
definition because, unlike a first symptom test, the diagnosis would
put plaintiff on notice that he has a claim against someone. As
CPLR 214-c(2) includes within the statute of limitations the time
that the plaintiff should have discovered his injury, a broad interpretation of time of discovery would not be subject to abuse by
those who deliberately avoid medical treatment in order to toll the
limitations period. 47 It is suggested that a formulation which
postpones plaintiff's time to sue until the condition is diagnosed is
the best reading of CPLR 214-c(2) that can be supported by its
language.4 8
Notwithstanding a liberal formulation of the discovery rule,
plaintiffs who become aware of their injury but have not discovered its cause are afforded a limited measure of relief under CPLR
214-c(4). 49 This section provides that if the cause of the injury is
tion did not accrue with the appearance of shortness of breath, the Young court stated that:
With a complex of symptoms this ignorant layman could not in fairness be
charged with a recognition of his silicosis because one of his symptoms was shortness of breath. This is not a specific symptom of silicosis; it is commonly indicative of many other diseases as well. Failure to associate it with silicosis at this
early date cannot be treated as fault or neglect or a circumstance sufficient to
create a factual issue. Residence in mining country... does not invest one with
the expert knowledge or diagnostic skill sought to be attributed to the plaintiff.
Id.

4' The underlying purpose of the statute was to remedy the injustice of the Schmidt
rule. See Memorandum, supra note 40. In approving the bill, Governor Cuomo stated:
[The Bill] remedies a fundamental injustice in the laws of our State which has
deprived persons suffering from exposure to toxic or harmful substances from having an opportunity to present their case in court. That injustice results from an
archaic rule which commences the three year time period for suit on the date that
an exposure occurs. The rule fails to recognize that the adverse effects of many of
these toxic substances do not manifest themselves until many years after the exposure takes place. In such cases, a person is barred from court before he or she is
aware of any injury.
Id.
48 See Rheingold, supra note 42, at 1, col. 4. See also Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288
F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1961) (time when plaintiff knows he is injured generally when
diagnosed).
,7 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
48 See id. § 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987).
" See id. § 214-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1987). This section provides that:
[w]here the discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have occurred less
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discovered less than five years after the injury was or should have
been discovered, the plaintiff may commence an action within one
year after the date the cause of the injury is discovered.5 0 However,
the plaintiff must plead and prove a lack of existing information
that might have uncovered the cause of the injury within the initial statutory period.5 1 This section, criticized as overly complex
and less than artfully drafted, will create many issues of interpretation for New York courts to resolve.52 The conceivable judicial
constructions may range from requiring an objective, individual
lack of knowledge concerning the cause of the plaintiff's illness,53
to mandating proof that no one, not even the defendant, could
have known the cause. 4 While the language of the statute seems to
suggest that the latter meaning is correct, it is suggested that such
a reading is unduly burdensome to the plaintiff and would be virtually impossible to satisfy considering the present state of medical
knowledge.
The specific discovery provision of CPLR 214-c(4) precludes
the use of the liberal causal connection formulation of the discovery rule which is gaining acceptance in many jurisdictions. 55 The
than five years after discovery of the injury or when with reasonable diligence
such injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier, an action may be
commenced or a claim filed within one year of such discovery of the cause of the
injury; provided... the plaintiff or claimant shall be required to allege and prove
that technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or determined
prior to the expiration of the period within which the action or claim would have
been authorized.
Id.
DoSee id.
5' See id.
" See Rheingold, supra note 42, at 3, col. 1; N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c, commentary at 303 (McKinney Supp. 1987). "It need not be said that this is a complicated statute.
It reeks of the midnight oil of political compromise. And the draftsmanship cannot be described as commendable." Id.
"' See Rheingold, supra note 42, at 3, col. 1. "The term 'cause of the injury' should be
given a meaning consistent with the thrust of the statute and should imply that the plaintiff
has sufficient knowledge to bring an action." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c, commentary at
303 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
54 See Rheingold, supra note 42, at 3, col. 1. If this meaning is correct, the result would
be absurd, "since the almost universal situation is that the defendant knows what his product is doing but isn't talking about it (and may indeed be actively concealing it)." Id. at 3,
col. 2.
"I The causal connection formulation is becoming more widely accepted as thirteen
states have adopted this rule. See supra note 6 (describing this approach); note 40. A causal
connection approach cannot be taken under CPLR 214-c(2) because of the very specific
discovery of the cause language in CPLR 214-c(4). See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c(4)
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distinction between this rule and that adopted by CPLR 214-c is
significant because there are many cases in which a person is aware
of his illness but does not know of the causal connection between
the disease and the substance to which he was exposed.5 6 It is submitted that the provisions of CPLR 214-c(2) and CPLR 214-c(4)
should have been combined to form a broad discovery rule which
would start the statutory clock when the plaintiff discovered his
injury and the fact that it was caused by the defendant's conduct.
DEFINING "EXPOSURE TO ANY SUBSTANCE"

The discovery rule of CPLR 214-c applies to actions for personal injury or property damage caused by the latent effects of
"exposure to any substance. ' ' 57 Although the term "exposure" is

defined in some detail in the statute, 5 the meaning and scope of
(McKinney Supp. 1987).
" See Marlin & Levy, supra note 18, at 30, col. 1. See also Ward v. Desachem Co., 771
F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1985). In Ward, plaintiff was exposed to various chemicals in connection
with his employment. Id. at 665. Plaintiff complained of irritability, fatigue, and sensations
in his chest and visited a physician in 1978. Id. The doctor concluded that plaintiff was
physically sound, but was suffering from depression and fatigue. Id. Relying on this misdiagnosis, plaintiff returned to work and was again exposed to the toxic chemicals. Id. The
symptoms continued, and plaintiff was later diagnosed, in 1980, as having "asthma produced by exposure to noxious fumes." Id. Plaintiff commenced the action in 1981, more
than three years after the symptoms were discovered. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, holding that the three years, measured from the time
Ward discovered his injury, had expired. Id. at 666. The circuit court, however, reversed,
holding that the time is computed from the date of the last exposure, not from discovery,
under the traditional New York rule. Id. at 666-67. As a result, plaintiff had a longer time to
sue than he would have under the discovery rule since the last exposure occurred after the
discovery of the injury. Accord Harrell v. Koppers Co., 118 App. Div. 2d 682, 499 N.Y.S.2d
968 (2d Dep't 1986) (statute of limitations accrues on date of last exposure). See also N.Y.
CIV. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c, commentary at 301-02 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (discussing distinction between discovery of injury and discovery of cause). "[T]he Ward case dramatically
illustrates the distinction between the discovery of the injury and discovery of its cause,
[and] it also flushes out a central weakness in the new statute ....the term 'discovery of the
injury.'" Id. at 302.
In his commentary, Professor McLaughlin notes the following problems of
interpretation:
How much must be known before it can reasonably be said that the plaintiff
knows "of the cause of the injury"? In the Ward case, for example, would it be
sufficient if the plaintiff learned that his injury was caused by something he had
breathed, but did not know whether it was asbestos or chlorine? Must he be able
to identify the correct defendant? And must he also have arrived at a theory of
liability, e.g., a design defect as distinct from a manufacturing defect?
Id. at 303.
17 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc.L. & R. § 214-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
" See id. § 2 14-c(1). Exposure is defined as "direct or indirect exposure by absorption,
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the term "substance" has been left for the courts to resolve.59 With
several definitions available, it is conceivable that the word "substance" could be narrowly interpreted to mean "chemical," 60 or be
given a broader "material" definition." A "material" definition
would encompass actions involving solid substances as well as
chemicals, such as the suits against the manufacturers of Dalkon
Shield IUD's 62 and artificial heart valves.63 In contrast, the discov-

ery rule of CPLR 214-a, applicable to medical malpractice actions,
defines its operative term "foreign objects" as expressly excluding
chemical compounds, fixation devices and prosthetic aids and devices. 4 It is suggested that the discovery rule as adopted under
CPLR 214-c must be extended to include all substances which had
previously been excluded under CPLR 214-a in order to fulfill legislative intent.6 5
APPROACHES TO ACCRUAL IN EXPOSURE CASES

While a majority of jurisdictions apply a "discovery rule" in
name, 66 the approaches used by these jurisdictions are by no
means uniform in practice.67 One formulation of the discovery rule
holds that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff's disease manifests itself.68 The question of when a disease has
contact, ingestion, inhalation or injection." Id.
59 See id. § 214-c.
60 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2279 (14th ed. 1963).
" See id.
62 See, e.g., Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469
N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983) (IUD caused injury discovered years later-Schmidt rule applied by
court).
11 See, e.g., Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1983) (artificial heart valve caused injury after several years-court applied
Schmidt rule).
6 N.Y. Cwv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1987); see supra note 34.
65 The legislative history supports a broad definition of "substance." See Memorandum
of Sen. Stafford introducing S-9391 (1986). The purposes and justification of the Act speak
in terms of exposure to "toxic or harmful substances." Id. It is suggested that the use of the
words toxic and harmful indicate and intent to define substance in broad terms, and not
limit it to chemicals. In addition, the title "An Act to amend the [Civil Practice] law and
rules... in relation to statute of limitations and liability for damages caused by the latent
effects of exposure to certain substances or materials," supports a broad definition of substance. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 9391 (McKinney 1986).
66 See supra note 5.
6 Compare Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (action accrues when
causal connection with defendant's conduct discovered) with Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S.
163 (1949) (action accrues when injury manifests itself). See supra note 6; infra notes 68-75.
68 See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis-action accrued when ef-
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manifested itself is often a medical question. 9 While it has been
generally held that this occurs upon diagnosis, a disease can be
considered manifested before it is diagnosed if the plaintiff should
have been aware of the disease at an earlier date.7 0 It is submitted

that this approach is too narrow and could result in the statute of
limitations commencing with the appearance of the first symptom
of the plaintiff's illness.
Another formulation of the discovery rule holds that the action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when the
plaintiff's condition is diagnosed.7 1 Unlike the manifestation theory, this approach would not start the statutory clock until the
plaintiff had notice of a claim against another party.72 It is submitted that any potential abuses of the diagnostic formulation could
be avoided by computing the statute of limitations from the time
the disease was or should have been discovered, thereby preventing
a potential plaintiff from unreasonably refusing to seek medical
attention.
A formulation of the discovery rule which is finding increasing
acceptance states that the statute of limitations runs from the time
the plaintiff discovers both the injury and its causal connection to
the defendant's conduct.7 This interpretation is premised on the
fects manifested themselves); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.
1975) (action accrues when harm or impairment manifests itself). In Urie, the "Court clearly
adopted the view that where an injury does not manifest itself immediately, the cause of
action should accrue not when the injury was initially inflicted, but when the plaintiff had
reason to know he had been injured." Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 286.
" See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 281.
70 See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949). "Generally, the cause of action
would accrue when plaintiff's condition was diagnosed, unless there was evidence that plaintiff should have known at an earlier date that he was injured." Birnbaum, supra note 3, at
286. But see Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff should not
have known he was sick even though symptoms had manifested themselves). See also supra
note 44 (discussing Young).
7 See, e.g., Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499, 503 (4th Cir. 1961) (plaintiff knows
he is injured on diagnosis). See also Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 281 (discussion of time of
injury for statute of limitations purposes in products liability actions).
7 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff must have knowledge of relationship between offense and damages sustained to start
clock); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (action accrues when
plaintiff discovers causal relationship between harm and defendant's conduct); Lopez v.
Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (action will not accrue until plaintiff knows he has
basis for actionable claim). Thirteen states have recently adopted this formulation. See J.
TRAUBERMAN, supra note 5, at 173 n.94 (citing INJURIES AND DAMAGES, supra note 5, at 2829).
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theory that a cause of action cannot be maintained until the plaintiff has discovered that the defendant's conduct caused the injury.7 41 This causal connection approach applies where a plaintiff
knows there is an injury but is not aware that it may be attributable to the fault of another.7 5 It is submitted that this formulation
provides for the most equitable results. Moreover, it is asserted
that the New York legislature should have expressly adopted this
formulation of the discovery rule rather than the narrow provisions
of CPLR 214-c.
CONCLUSION

The New York Legislature took a long overdue step in July,
1986 by adopting the discovery rule in CPLR 214-c. This statute
will provide a remedy for thousands of exposure victims who had
heretofore been kept out of court. Although a step in the right direction, CPLR 214-c is not free from shortcomings which could result in the continuance of the many inequities encountered under
the traditional first breath rule. The next step belongs to the
courts, and it is hoped that they will further the intent of the legislature rather than wait for future legislative action as they have
done in the past. The courts must now take the initiative and liberally and justly interpret and apply the rules of CPLR 214-c.
Andrew L. Margulis

74 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th Cir.
1963). The Reynolds court stated that:
Knowledge of the date of the occurrence of the offense, knowledge of some injury
resulting from the act causing the damage, and the objective manifestation of the
injury are not enough.... Hudson's cause of action did not accrue until Hudson
knew or should have known that his acute respiratory distress and diseased larynx
were caused by smoking.
Id. at 783. The Reynolds court further stated that blackletter authority holds "that pain
and suffering and the physical manifestation of injury may not be sufficient to start prescription running, if the plaintiff has good cause for not having knowledge of the connection
between the offense and the damages sustained." Id.
1 See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973).

